Minimizing Antitrust Risks of Blue Cross and Blue Shield Plans by Steele, Charles J.
Journal of Contemporary Health Law & Policy (1985-2015) 
Volume 4 Issue 1 Article 12 
1988 
Minimizing Antitrust Risks of Blue Cross and Blue Shield Plans 
Charles J. Steele 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.edu/jchlp 
Recommended Citation 
Charles J. Steele, Minimizing Antitrust Risks of Blue Cross and Blue Shield Plans, 4 J. Contemp. Health L. 
& Pol'y 227 (1988). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.edu/jchlp/vol4/iss1/12 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by CUA Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted 
for inclusion in Journal of Contemporary Health Law & Policy (1985-2015) by an authorized editor of CUA Law 
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact edinger@law.edu. 
MINIMIZING ANTITRUST RISKS OF
BLUE CROSS AND BLUE SHIELD PLANS
Charles J. Steele*
INTRODUCTION
In Becker v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Southwestern Virginia, Inc.,1
Johnson v. New Mexico Blue Cross and Blue Shield,2 General Hospitals of
Humana, Inc. v. Baptist Medical System, Inc.,' and perhaps other cases,
plaintiffs charged Blue Cross and Blue Shield plans and some or all of their
trustees4 with violations of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.5 While in none of
these cases did plaintiffs obtain judgments against the individual trustees,
they highlight the fact that trustees as well as plans are antitrust targets. For
that and other reasons, it obviously is important to minimize antitrust risks,
especially in this era of rampant antitrust activity in the field of health care
financing.
Becker was an alleged boycott case brought by chiropractors in southwest-
ern Virginia against the Roanoke, Richmond and District of Columbia
plans.6 Also named as defendants were the physician trustees of the three
plans. The theory behind naming only the physicians apparently was that
they were competitors of chiropractors and they had their own economic
stake in maintaining the boycott. At last word, the case was still pending.7
Johnson is also an alleged boycott case, but in Johnson the plaintiff chiro-
* Partner, Pierson, Ball & Dowd, Washington, D.C.
1. CV81-0320-R (W.D.Va. filed Sept. 10, 1981) (pending since reopened May 14, 1986).
2. 1987-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 67,737 (D.N.M. 1987).
3. 1986-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 66,996 (E.D. Ark. 1986).
4. While plans generally use the term "trustees" rather than directors, the plan boards of
trustees act as boards of directors. The fiduciary duties of plan trustees have been held to be
the duties of corporate directors rather than the higher duties of trustees. Christiansen v.
National Savings and Trust Co., 683 F.2d 520 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
Christiansen was not an antitrust case but three trustees and the CEO of the D.C. plan along
with the plan itself were among the defendants. The class action plaintiffs charged that the
plan left unnecessarily large amounts in non-interest bearing accounts in banks which had
officers or directors on the board of the plan. The court of appeals affirmed summary judg-
ment in favor of defendants.
5. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1986).
6. Subsequent to the complaint being filed, the Richmond and Roanoke plans merged
their operations.
7. The plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the D.C. plan and its trustees.
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practors named all trustees, including the plan's CEO, as defendants. Fol-
lowing a change in counsel, plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the individual
defendants, leaving only the plan and the state medical society as defendants.
In Humana, the plaintiff proprietary hospital chain alleged a conspiracy
among two Little Rock hospitals, the Arkansas plan, and others to keep
Humana out of the Little Rock market. Among "the others" were two exec-
utives of the defendant hospitals who sat on the plan board. In a series of
four separate orders and opinions, the court granted summary judgment in
favor of all defendants, both corporate and individual.
In Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp.,' the Supreme Court
held that a corporation and its wholly owned subsidiaries are incapable of
conspiring with each other for purposes of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. In
so doing the Court expressly held, "officers or employees of the same firm do
not provide the plurality of actors imperative for a § 1 conspiracy."' If a
corporation is incapable of conspiring with its employees, why are plan
trustees being named defendants in Section 1 Sherman Act suits? The an-
swer is found in the "independent stake exception," alluded to by the Court
in Copperweld when it said "many courts have created an exception for cor-
porate officers acting on their own behalf."' °
In Weiss v. York Hospital, " the Third Circuit held that "the medical staff
[of a hospital] is a combination" as a matter of law. Can the same be said for
the board of trustees of a plan? At least in the absence of provider control of
the board, the answer is no; but as was held in Virginia Academy of Clinical
Psychologists v. Blue Shield of Virginia, 2 the board can be a combination as
a matter of fact. The Weiss holding that the medical staff was a "walking
conspiracy" and not a single entity rested on the premise that "[e]ach staff
member... [had] an economic interest separate from and in many cases in
competition with the interests of other medical staff members."' 3 The same
requirement should exist with respect to plan boards, for example, unless the
trustees have an economic interest separate from and in competition with the
interests of other trustees, the board should be considered a single entity
incapable of a Section 1 conspiracy.
So, how do a plan and its trustees minimize their risk of being sued in
8. 467 U.S. 752 (1984).
9. Id. at 769.
10. Id. at 769-70, n.15. (The Court cited, in support of its proposition, H & B Equipment
Co. v. International Harvester Co., 577 F.2d 239, 244 (5th Cir. 1978); Greenville Publishing
Co. v. Daily Reflector, Inc., 496 F.2d 391, 399 (4th Cir. 1974) (dictum); and Johnston v.
Baker, 445 F.2d 424, 427 (3rd Cir. 1971).
11. 745 F.2d 786, 814 (3rd Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1060 (1985).
12. 624 F.2d 476 (4th Cir. 1980).
13. 745 F.2d at 815.
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antitrust cases? The answer is not easy. The plans have won a large major-
ity of the antitrust suits brought against them, an indication of the fact that
it is not possible to prevent bad antitrust suits from being filed. One ap-
proach is to examine the kind of suits that have been filed and the kind of
plaintiffs who filed them. One conclusion to be drawn from this approach is
that the plans can not change all the policies that led to the filing of the suits.
To do so would not only change the nature of the plans, it would cripple
their operations. This effect would result because those suits have attacked,
among other things, provider differentials, the usual, customary and reason-
able reimbursement formula, peer review of the reasonableness of provider
charges, bans on balance billing, exclusive service areas under the plan li-
cense agreements with Blue Cross Blue Shield Association ("BCBSA"), par-
ticipation in health care planning, the operation of Preferred Provider
Organizations ("PPOs") and the right not to contract with every type of
health care provider.
I. THE DIFFERENTIAL
The manner in which plans reimburse hospitals for care rendered to sub-
scribers has changed over the years, but many plans still enjoy a differential
or, as others call it, a discount. Even in Maryland, where the Health Serv-
ices Cost Review Commission sets rates for hospitals, the plans operating in
that state receive a six percent differential.14 The differential was the subject
of the first major antitrust case involving a Blue Cross plan.
In Travelers Insurance Co. v. Blue Cross of Western Pennsylvania,15 Trav-
elers charged the plan with restraining trade in violation of Section 1 of the
Sherman Act and with monopolizing and attempting to monopolize in viola-
tion of Section 2. The district court found that the plan's conduct was im-
munized by the McCarran-Ferguson Act and that even if it were not, there
was no violation of the Sherman Act. The Third Circuit agreed.16
14. See, Blue Cross of Maryland, Inc. v. Franklin Square Hospital, 277 Md. 793, 352
A.2d 798 (1976); and Health Services Cost Review Commission v. Franklin Square Hospital,
372 A.2d 1051 (Md. 1977) for an explanation of the method of operation of the Commission and
its relationship with Blue Cross plans..
15. 481 F.2d 80 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1973).
16. In finding the McCarran-Ferguson Act applicable, the court said:
In the present case, the district court found that the interrelationship of hospital
payments and subscribers' rates was such that Blue Cross' arrangement with hospi-
tals should be considered part of the "business of insurance." This conclusion is a
sound construction of the law and is amply supported by the evidence.
481 F.2d at 83. The Supreme Court subsequently disagreed that the plans' provider contracts
were part of the business of insurance and fell within the McCarran-Ferguson Act exemption
in Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., Inc., 440 U.S. 205 (1979). See also, Union
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In Travelers, the plan provided hospitalization coverage for fifty-one per-
cent of the population in its twenty-nine county service area. The plan ac-
counted for sixty-two percent of all patient days covered by insurance other
than Medicare and Medicaid. It had contracts with 101 hospitals under
which it reimbursed the hospitals only for audited costs, subject to a ceiling
and not including expenses of capital construction, free services to indigents
and bad debts. This resulted in a fourteen to fifteen percent differential. It
also subsidized poor risk subscribers to the tune of $27,000,000 in the year
1960, and its hospital contracts were approved by the State Insurance
Department.
On the merits, the court held that even if the plan had "monopoly power,"
an issue the court did not reach, "Blue Cross's arrangement with hospitals
neither illegally restrains trade in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act
nor constitutes, in violation of Section 2, 'the willful acquisition or mainte-
nance of that power as distinguished from growth or development as a con-
sequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident,'"
applying the criteria set forth in United States v. Grinnell Corp. 7
The court went on to say that the case did not fit into any of the "garden
variety" vertical restraints such as tie-ins and exclusive dealing arrangements
and had to be looked at on its own facts in order to reveal whether any
restraint of trade it caused was reasonable. In language that makes one long
for the good old days the court found the plans conduct reasonable, saying:
In its negotiating with hospitals, Blue Cross has done no more than
conduct its business as every rational enterprise does, i.e., get the
best deal possible. This pressure encourages hospitals to keep their
costs down; and, for its own competitive advantage, Blue Cross
passes along the saving thus realized to consumers. To be sure,
Blue Cross's initiative makes life harder for commercial competi-
tors such as Travelers. The antitrust laws, however, protect com-
petition, not competitors; and stiff competition is encouraged, not
condemned. It must be pointed out that the size of its competitors
does not give Blue Cross the freedom to conduct other than fair
competition for business. The dependence of the community on
health facilities requires that anti-competitive practices not be
tolerated. 8
As for Section 2: The district court found, on ample evidence,
that Blue Cross owes its success to the completeness of its cover-
age. From the time of its organization in the late 1930's, Blue
Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119 (1982) and Ratino v. Medical Service of District of
Columbia, 718 F.2d 1260 (4th Cir. 1983).
17. 481 F.2d at 84. See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966).
18. 481 F.2d at 84.
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Cross has reimbursed hospitals for all covered services rendered its
subscribers. Private companies, on the other hand, have, until rela-
tively recently, provided only that their policyholders would be in-
demnified up to a set dollar ceiling. Blue Cross thus has exposed
itself to considerably greater risk because of the possibility that
treatment would be extensive and because of the probability that
hospital costs would rise. By shouldering the risk, Blue Cross has
made itself considerably more attractive to consumers. The anti-
trust laws were not intended to condemn such conduct.' 9
II. PRICE FIXING AND USUAL, CUSTOMARY AND REASONABLE;
PEER REVIEW OF REASONABLENESS; THE
BANON BALANCE BILLING
In Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society,2" physicians belonging to
a "foundation for medical care" agreed to charge no more than agreed upon
maximum fee schedules as payment in full for their services to policyholders
of certain insurance companies. The physicians could charge less than the
scheduled amount and charges to uninsured patients were unrestricted. The
foundation, to which most area physicians belonged, formulated the fee
schedules and submitted them for approval to the membership. The mem-
bership was composed of competing physicians. The Supreme Court found
the scheme to be horizontal price fixing, pure and simple, and a per se viola-
tion of section 1 of the Sherman Act.
Dr. John Ratino contended that the usual, customary and reasonable re-
imbursement formula used by the District of Columbia Blue Shield plan,
especially when coupled with peer review of the reasonableness of contested
fees by a committee of the Montgomery County, Maryland Medical Society,
fell within the proscriptions of Maricopa. The result was Ratino v. Medical
Service of the District of Columbia.2
Dr. Ratino, a plastic surgeon, belonged to the Montgomery County
[Maryland] Medical Society. At one time, he was a participating physician
with Medical Service of the District of Columbia ("MSDC"), the Blue
Shield plan for the metropolitan Washington area. He resigned in 1974.
MSDC reimbursed physicians for most of the care rendered to its sub-
scribers under a usual, customary and reasonable ("UCR") formula. Under
UCR, MSDC would pay the treating physician's usual fee, provided the fee
was within the customary range of area fees for that service, or, in the event
of unusual circumstances, was otherwise reasonable. The "customary" com-
19. Id. at 85.
20. 457 U.S. 332 (1982).
21. 718 F.2d 1260 (4th Cir. 1983).
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ponent, known as the maximum customary allowance or MCA, was derived
by ascertaining the ninetieth percentile of charges through a computer
check of all charges submitted in a given year. The MCA was fixed at that
ninetieth percentile. Unlike Maricopa, physicians did not vote on the maxi-
mum fee for a given procedure.
A patient or treating physician could challenge the MCA in a given case,
either by claiming that the MCA did not in fact accurately reflect the nineti-
eth percentile or that because of the circumstances of the particular case a
fee higher than the MCA was reasonable. In the event of such a challenge,
MSDC would send the case to the medical society to which the physician
belonged, in Dr. Ratino's case the Montgomery County Medical Society
("MCMS"). The fee review committee of MCMS, after removing the name
of patient and physician, would submit a summary of the case to physicians
in the same specialty as the treating physician. In turn, the physicians polled
would advise the committee of what they considered to be a reasonable fee
or reasonable range of fees. The committee would then determine the rea-
sonable fee and advise MSDC and the physician. The committee and medi-
cal society considered the fee thus arrived at to be advisory only. The
participating physician and MSDC agreed, however, that it would be bind-
ing as to them. As noted, Dr. Ratino was not a participating physician and
so was bound by no such agreement. Most significantly, the fee arrived at
was limited to the case at hand. It created no new maximum customary
allowance. It did not become a component of a maximum customary allow-
ance. It was never used again.
At first the district court did not reach the legality of this reimbursement
system. It granted summary judgment on McCarran-Ferguson grounds.
Dr. Ratino appealed and between the time of the ruling below and the oral
argument before the Fourth Circuit the Supreme Court decided Union La-
bor Life Insurance Co. v. Pireno.22 In Pireno the Supreme Court held that
agreements between insurers and peer review committees dealing with the
reasonableness of fees were not part of the business of insurance and thus did
not fall within the McCarran-Ferguson Act exemption. The Fourth Circuit,
therefore, reversed and remanded Ratino to the District Court for trial. In
doing so, it set forth certain guidelines, saying:
Ratino raised a number of allegations in his complaint which if
proved could be indicative of a conspiracy to fix the customary fee:
(1) He alleged that Blue Shield's Board of Trustees, which is re-
sponsible for establishing the UCR fee schedule, is controlled by
22. 458 U.S. 119 (1982).
Minimizing Antitrust Risks
physicians, and thus physicians effectively control the determina-
tion of the fee schedule.
(2) He alleged that physicians control the fee schedule in that
Blue Shield's agreement with participating physicians provides
that: (a) it will not change any of the mechanics "without the ap-
proval of the participating physicians by mail ballot for the life of
the UCR program;" and (b) "the UCR ... plan will be reviewed
biannually by the medical advisory council and the Board of Trust-
ees and submitted to the participating physicians to vote on contin-
uation or cancellation of the program on renewal dates."
(3) He alleged that the customary fee ceiling - arrived at by tak-
ing the 90th percentile of usual fees submitted for particular serv-
ices - is a system whereby physicians collectively exert control on
what the maximum fee schedule should be through submitting
their bills to Blue Shield. Ratino alleged that participating physi-
cians, in effect conspire without necessarily directly communicat-
ing - that through various means they individually obtain
information concerning how the system works from Blue Shield,
which is the central collector and user of the information employed
in the alleged price-fixing scheme. He alleges that each individual
physician obtains the information concerning the maximum fees
through submission of higher fees until they exceed the customary
ones. Once obtaining information as to the maximum allowable
fees, he contends that physicians adjust their fees to obtain the
maximum price allowed by the Blue Shield system for each service
and, at the same time, act to continually escalate the maximum
allowable fee.
(4) Ratino alleged that the peer review committees act as a polic-
ing mechanism aimed at intimidating participating as well as non-
participating physicians into conformity with the customary fee
schedule; and alleged numerous instances of the fee review com-
mittee attempts to dictate his fees through coercion. We cannot
predict whether Ratino will be able to prove these allegations. It
no doubt will be difficult, but the scenarios he alleges are not so
improbable that he should not have an opportunity to resolve the
allegations as primary issues of fact. If the district court finds that
in effect the physicians control the customary fee, under Maricopa
it must find such practice per se illegal.2"
Upon remand a two and one-half week jury trial took place. The jury was
out one hour and returned a verdict on behalf of all five defendants, the plan,
the medical society and the three physician members of the fee review com-
mittee. The Fourth Circuit's four guidelines had the following result at trial:
23. 718 F.2d at 1270, 1271 (footnotes omitted).
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(1) There was no evidence that physicians controlled the plan
board. One exhibit introduced by plaintiff was a memo signed by
the president of the Medical Society of the District of Columbia
calling for a mass meeting of physicians at the plan's office to pro-
test reimbursement policies. The jury may well have found that is
not the way control is normally exercised. In addition, there was
no evidence of how physicians voted on particular issues. Also, the
assumption that the board was responsible for establishing the
UCR fee schedule was erroneous. It was true that prompted by
the Civil Service Commission, which wanted full service benefits
for federal employees, the board had voted to adopt a UCR reim-
bursement system, but the maximum customary allowances had
never even been disclosed to the board let alone set by it.
(2) The facts that the mechanics of UCR could not be changed
without the approval of the participating physicians and that the
continuation of UCR was voted on by the participating physicians
every other year turned out to be non-issues at trial, as they should
have. If UCR did not fix or stabilize prices or otherwise restrain
trade, what difference should it make if participating physicians
had a veto power over its modification or termination.
(3) The allegation that the participating physicians individually
learned the maximum customary allowances and set their fees so as
to obtain the same maximum payment from the plan received con-
siderable attention at trial. The plan introduced bar graphs for
over seventy surgical procedures, including some customarily per-
formed by plastic surgeons, Dr. Ratino's specialty. A red bar
showed the maximum customary allowance. Blue bars showed the
actual fees charged. The fees did not come close to clustering
around the MCA. Most fees charged were less than the MCA;
some were more. If UCR was a conspiracy to allow physicians to
charge the maximum fee which the plan would pay then the bar
graphs indicated, as was argued to the jury, that the physician con-
spirators were the gang that couldn't shoot straight.
(4) The allegation that the medical society peer review committee
acted as an enforcer to coerce physicians to charge no more than
the MCA died for lack of proof.
There were two bottom lines in Ratino. With respect to the facts, the jury
obviously did not believe that the combination of UCR and peer review was
part of a conspiracy to stabilize prices. With respect to the law, neither the
district court nor the Fourth Circuit found UCR to constitute a per se viola-
tion. Maricopa was not imposed on the Blue Shield reimbursement system.
Ratino also involved a prohibition against the balance billing of subscrib-
ers by participating physicians. That issue was more central to Kartell v.
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Blue Shield of Massachusetts.24 To quote the First Circuit:
Blue Shield pays doctors for treating patients who are Blue Shield
health insurance subscribers, but only if each doctor promises not
to make any additional charge to the subscriber. The basic issue in
this case is whether this Blue Shield practice - called a "ban on
balance billing" - violates either Sherman Act § 1 forbidding
agreements "in restraint of trade," . . . or Sherman Act § 2 forbid-
ding "monopolization" and "attempts to monopolize.25
The district court had found a Section 1 violation. The First Circuit
reversed.
Kartell involved a typical UCR - no balance billing formula. What was
atypical was that Massachusetts Blue Shield's market share consisted of
about seventy-four percent of privately insured residents of Massachusetts.
"Virtually all" Massachusetts physicians participated and agreed not to bal-
ance bill.
The district court found that the effect of this system, when combined
with Blue Shield's size and buying power, produced an unreasonably rigid
and unjustifiably low set of prices. It interfered with the physician's freedom
to set higher prices for more expensive services and discouraged them from
developing and offering patients better services. Therefore, the district court
reasoned, the ban against balance billing unreasonably restrained trade.
In reversing, the First Circuit observed:
To find an unlawful restraint, one would have to look at Blue
Shield as if it were a "third force," intervening in the marketplace
in a manner that prevents willing buyers and sellers from indepen-
dently coming together to strike price/quality bargains.26
That, however, was not the case. Blue Shield was, the First Circuit ob-
served, not an inhibitory "third force" but rather was itself the purchaser of
the physicians' services, albeit for the account of others." A purchaser is
free to strike whatever bargain it can, including a ban on balance billing.
Physicians might argue that they sell their services only to their patients,
but "[t]he relevant antitrust facts are that Blue Shield pays the bill and seeks
to set the amount of the charge."
28
24. 749 F.2d 922 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1029 (1984).
25. Id. at 923.
26. Id. at 924.
27. Medical Arts Pharmacy of Stamford, Inc. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Connecticut,
Inc., 675 F.2d 502 (2d Cir. 1982). Travelers Insurance Co. v. Blue Cross of Western Penn-
sylvania, 481 F.2d 80 (3rd Cir.) cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1093 (1973); and Quality Auto Body, Inc.
v. Allstate Insurance Co., 660 F.2d 1195 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1020 (1982) were
cited for the proposition that Massachusetts Blue Shield was in fact a purchaser.
28. 749 F.2d at 926.
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But, the plaintiffs argued, in no other case did a buyer have the market
power of Massachusetts Blue Shield. Again the First Circuit disagreed.
There was no lower seller output. On the contrary, the number of physi-
cians in Massachusetts had increased over the past decade.
Even assuming, arguendo, that Massachusetts Blue Shield did have mar-
ket power and in addition used that market power to obtain "lower than
competitive prices" the result would not be different. As explained by the
court:
We [must] ask whether Blue Shield's assumed market power
makes a significant legal difference. As a matter of pure logic, to
distinguish the examples previously mentioned one must accept at
least one of the following three propositions: One must believe
either (1) that the law forbids a buyer with market power to bar-
gain for "uncompetitive" or "unreasonable" prices, or (2) that
such a buyer cannot buy for the account of others, or (3) that there
is some relevant difference between obtaining such price for oneself
and obtaining that price for others for whom one can lawfully buy.
In our view, each of these propositions is false, as a matter either of
law or of logic.29
As in Travelers, the court found nothing illegal about a buyer of medical
services driving a hard bargain.
The court then expressly considered the ban on balance billing. The plain-
tiff physicians had made several arguments similar to some of those made by
Dr. Ratino, including:
1. Price competition among physicians was "virtually eliminated
by the ban."
2. Doctors' prices have tended to cluster around Blue Shield's
"maximum price levels."
3. Doctors wanting to compete by offering innovative or "pre-
mium" services were inhibited from doing so.
The court responded:
The short - and conclusive - answer to these arguments is that
normally the choice of what to buy and what to offer to pay is the
buyer's. And, even if the buyer has monopoly power, an antitrust
court (which might, in appropriate circumstances, restructure the
market) will not interfere with a buyer's (nonpredatory) determi-
nation of price.30
The Court closed with some additional observations:
1. Unlike the situation in Virginia Academy of Clinical Psycholo-
29. Id. at 927.
30. Id. at 929.
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gists,3 in Kartell the plan and the doctors "sit on different sides of
the bargaining table."
32
2. Courts should be reluctant to condemn an arrangement to
bring low prices to consumers.
3. The price system at issue is supervised by state regulators.
4. Blue Shield has a right, so long as it acts unilaterally, not to
deal with physicians who decline to become participating
physicians.
5. Insufficient evidence existed to support plaintiffs' predatory
pricing claim.
6. The charge of conspiracy between the Shield plan and the
Cross plan fails because the objective of the alleged conspiracy - a
ban on balance billing - is lawful.
Provider control over, or substantial influence over, the prices which Blue
Cross and Blue Shield plans pay for services rendered to subscribers creates
serious antitrust problems. It is an invitation to litigation. Absent such pro-
vider influence or control, plans have wide latitude in arriving at the prices
they will pay.
III. EXCLUSIVE SERVICE AREAS UNDER BCBSA's
LICENSE AGREEMENT
Let us begin by acknowledging that the topic of exclusive service areas
under BCBSA's license agreements is a delicate subject. This is so because
suits involving the plans' exclusive service areas have been brought by, in-
cluding but not limited to, the Maryland and Ohio Attorney Generals. A
number of plans also have been on opposite sides in lawsuits involving this
issue. What follows is an effort to present an objective, hopefully clear, expo-
sition of the legal issues involved.
For purposes of this discussion, the operative document is the 1972 Blue
Cross Association ("BCA") license agreement. This agreement provides
that each plan shall have as its exclusive service area the area that the plan
was servicing on June 30, 1972.13
BCBSA is the licensor. One of BCBSA's predecessor corporations, BCA,
licensed the Cincinnati plan exclusively to use the Blue Cross name and logo
in certain counties in eastern and western Ohio that the plan serviced in
1972. Another of its predecessor corporations, Blue Shield Association
31. 624 F.2d 476 (4th Cir. 1980).
32. Kartell, 749 F.2d at 929 (quoting Royal Drug Co. v. Group Life & Health Ins. Co.,
737 F.2d 1433, 1438 (5th Cir. 1984).
33. There is a relatively limited exception for service areas that overlapped at the time.
The Blue Cross Association license agreement, or "pooling agreement," contains no exclusiv-
ity provision but is generally treated as if it does.
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("BSA") or (National Association of Blue Shield Plans "NABSP"), licensed
it, or a predecessor corporation, to use the Blue Shield name and logo. The
plan used the Blue Shield name and logo in all but five counties in Ohio.
In Blue Cross and Blue Shield Association v. Community Mutual Insur-
ance Corp. ,3' BCBSA sued the Cincinnati plan for injunctive relief to enforce
the exclusive service area provisions of the license agreement. The facts set
forth are as found by the Court in the slip opinion. Judge John W. Potter of
the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio found
that in August of 1985 the Cleveland and Toledo plans announced that they
would (1) merge and (2) "market under the Blue Shield name and ... con-
vert to their own account" the Cincinnati plan's Toledo area Blue Shield
business. 3 Judge Potter also found that:
BCBSA's top officials were aware of [the Cleveland plan's] Akron
area Blue Shield activities in late 1984 or early 1985. No action
was taken by BCBSA to restore [the Cincinnati plan's] business or
to arrest further conversions of [the Cincinnati Plan's] Blue Shield
business in the six county region.36
The court further found that on September 16, 1985, the Cincinnati plan
notified BCBSA that it planned to operate statewide using the names and
logos. 37 Two days later BCBSA filed this suit against the Cincinnati plan
seeking an injunction to enforce the exclusive service area provisions in the
license agreement.
The Ohio Attorney General intervened in the litigation, taking the posi-
tion that the exclusive service area provision of the license agreement vio-
lated Section 1 of the Sherman Act and that the injunction should not be
issued. The Cincinnati plan also argued that "the licensing agreements con-
stitute horizontal market allocations under Section 1 of the Sherman Act...
and that BCBSA is guilty of unclean hands' in that it failed to take legal
action against others allegedly encroaching upon [its] marketing area." 31
The antitrust issue was, therefore, squarely before the court.
In refusing to issue the injunction the court arrived at some thought pro-
voking conclusions of law, including the following:
As to the aspect of likelihood of confusion among consumers, the
Court finds that due to the multiplicity of various plans in any
given area and cardholders of such plans, and sophistication of
34. No. C85-7872 (N.D. Ohio filed October 18, 1985).
35. Id. at 5 (findings of fact and conclusions of law for preliminary injunction).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 6.
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coverage procurers, i.e., employers, there is little likelihood of ad-
ded confusion.
Since approximately 80 percent of Blue Cross/Blue Shield card-
holders do not directly contract with an underwriter, but instead
subscribe to their insurance plan through an employer or other
source, the need or the desire of the individual cardholder to know
which company underwrites the policy is of little consequence.
The Court is also not convinced that hospital clerks or doctor of-
fice personnel who might have to process insurance claims from
competing Blue Cross or Blue Shield plans will be faced with un-
due confusion, or will place the responsibility of deciding level cov-
erage back in the hands of the cardholder. Plaintiff admitted that
even without competition from other plans, these clerks have to
already make these decisions. Within a service plan area, many
levels of coverage are offered.
BCBSA has permitted other plans to compete against CMIC, yet
BCBSA has not permitted CMIC to compete against its competi-
tors. This, the Court views as a substantial hardship for CMIC, a
factor the Court uses to balance with the other factors considered.
The parties have argued the doctrine of unclean hands and its
availability. The Court has considered the fact that the plaintiff
has failed to take legal action against the actions or proposed ac-
tions of the Cleveland, Akron and Toledo Plans as it relates to the
balancing of harm on a preliminary injunction proceeding.
The defenses of unclean hands and/or antitrust have a logical con-
nection "between the right plaintiff asserts" and the conduct of the
defendant. As to the antitrust allegation, the State of Ohio is also
presenting ,this proposition and advances the proposition that the
plaintiff is using its trademark licensing to permit competition
among the member plans. The Court has balanced this contention
and the evidence adduced in the weighting process as to likelihood
of success on the merits.
For the purpose of this preliminary injunction, BCBSA has failed
to show a likelihood of success on the merits. Further, BCBSA
will not suffer irreparable harm as a result of this denial and seri-
ous injury will result to the enjoined party. Finally, the public in-
terest will be furthered if this Court denies plaintiff's motion. 9
The Maryland allocation of territory litigation had a different genesis. In
Maryland v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield Association " the Maryland Attor-
39. Id. at 7-8 (citations ommitted).
40. 620 F. Supp. 907 (D. Md. 1985).
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ney General filed a Section 1 Sherman Act suit against BCBSA, the Mary-
land plan and the District of Columbia plan attacking the exclusive service
areas of the Maryland and District of Columbia plans in that state on two
bases: 1) The license agreement; and 2) An agreement between the two
plans as to the line dividing their service areas.41
After much discovery and shortly before the court was scheduled to rule
on whether the case should be tried under a per se theory or a rule of reason
analysis, the case was settled. This settlement is effective until the later of
January 1, 1991 or the completion of the Assembly of Plans. The key para-
graph in the settlement agreement reads as follows:
The parties agree that in regard to Blue Cross and Blue Shield
health care financing, the licensing agreements between the De-
fendant Plans and the Blue Cross and Blue Shield Association re-
main in full force and effect. Defendants agree that each Defendant
Plan may enroll a Maryland headquartered group or individual lo-
cated within the traditional service area of the other Plan , provided
that such enrollment is otherwise consistent with: (i) the owner-
ship, enforcement, and administration of the BLUE CROSS and
BLUE SHIELD trade names and service marks by the Blue Cross
and Blue Shield Association; (ii) the rights and obligations of the
Defendant Plans as licensees of such trade names and service
marks; and (iii) the independent business judgment of the enrolling
Defendant Plan. (emphasis added).
The first sentence appears to be a capitulation by the Attorney General. The
underlined clause of the second sentence, however, abrogates the license
agreement in that both the Maryland and District of Columbia plans can sell
throughout each other's service areas. Subparagraph (ii) appears to reinstate
the exclusive service area provision of the license agreement because market-
ing outside the exclusive service areas must be consistent with "the rights
and obligations of the Defendant plans as licensees of such trade names and
service marks."
The Attorney General issued a press release which clearly sets forth his
interpretation. It reads in part:
According to the settlement agreement, each Blue Cross and Blue
Shield Plan may market its traditional Blue Cross and Blue Shield
health insurance, health maintenance organizations, preferred-pro-
vider plans, third party administration services, and other insur-
ance products throughout the state. Consistent with the antitrust
laws, the settlement agreement provides that each plan will use its
independent business judgment in deciding where it will sell its
41. Id.
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health insurance. "The settlement promotes the purpose of the an-
titrust laws by ensuring that the business decisions of potential
competitors are made independently and without regard to artifi-
cial marketing barriers," [Attorney General] Curran said.
Prior to the settlement, according to the lawsuit, the Washington,
D.C. Plan was restricted to offering its traditional Blue Cross and
Blue Shield insurance only in certain areas of Maryland in the
Washington metropolitan area. The Maryland Blue Cross and
Blue Shield Plan was able to market its Blue Cross and Blue Shield
products only in the remainder of the state and could not offer
them in the restricted Washington suburban areas. This alleged
agreement between the two Blue Cross and Blue Shield Plans was
implemented by the trademark licensing agreements between the
national Blue Cross and Blue Shield Association and the local
plans.
According to the settlement agreement, the trademark licensing
agreements remain in full force and effect but each of the Blue
Cross and Blue Shield Plans may now, exercising independent
business judgment, sell its products outside its traditional market-
42ing areas.
The legal basis for the Ohio and Maryland Attorney Generals' cases rests
on the Supreme Court's opinion in United States v. Topco Associates, Inc. 
43
Topco was a cooperative association of independent regional supermarket
chains. It was formed to act as a purchasing agent and to develop a private
label merchandise program for its members. Each Topco member was
granted a license to sell trademarked Topco brand products only in an exclu-
sive territory, and each was generally prohibited from selling such goods to
other retailers. The district court, refusing to apply a per se rule, determined
that the territorial and customer restrictions, although eliminating in-
trabrand competition in Topco products, were reasonable as they promoted
and enhanced interbrand competition with national supermarket chains.
The Supreme Court rejected the rule of reason approach and stated: "One of
the classic examples of a per se violation of Section 1 is an agreement be-
tween competitors at the same level of the market structure to allocate terri-
tories in order to minimize competition."'
After remand, the Supreme Court summarily affirmed a final judgment
permitting Topco to utilize areas of primary responsibility, designate ware-
house locations, determine the locations of places of business for trademark
licensees, terminate the membership of businesses not adequately promoting
42. News Release, Office of Joseph Curran, Jr., Att'y Gen. of Maryland (April 3, 1987).
43. 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
44. Id. at 608.
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Topco products, and formulate and implement profit passovers, unless such
practices directly or indirectly achieved or maintained territorial exclusivity.
In Topco, the Supreme Court also expressly struck down Topco's cus-
tomer restrictions preventing members from selling Topco's private label
goods to wholesalers, thereby treating customer allocation among competi-
tors, as well as market division as a per se violation of Section 1.
The Ohio and Maryland Attorney Generals argued that BCBSA stands in
the same position as Topco, i.e., that it is a trade association controlled by its
members who are potential horizontal competitors.
The plans involved in the Maryland litigation relied upon the fact that the
doctrine that the Supreme Court enunciated in Topco has been eroded over
the years. Indeed, in Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc.,4
Judge Bork wrote for the court:
If Topco and Sealy ... state the law of horizontal restraints, the
restraints imposed by Atlas [Van Lines] would appear to be a per
se violation of the Sherman Act. An examination of more recent
Supreme Court decisions, however, demonstrates that to the extent
that Topco and Sealy stand for the proposition that all horizontal
restraints are illegal per se, they must be regarded as effectively
overruled.4 6
The "more recent Supreme Court decisions" relied upon by Judge Bork
were Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System;47 National
Collegiate Athletic Association v. Board of Regents ;4' and Northern Whole-
sale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co. 49 If in the Maryland
case the court held that the rule of reason was the proper standard, counsel
for the defendant plans hoped to persuade the court that the exclusive ser-
vice areas were more pro-competitive than anti-competitive and were there-
fore lawful.
IV. PARTICIPATION IN HEALTH PLANNING
In National Gerimedical Hospital and Gerontology Center v. Blue Cross of
Kansas City,5° the Supreme Court refused to exempt from antitrust scrutiny
the decision of the Kansas plan not to accept the plaintiff as a participating
provider despite the fact that the decision was made in furtherance of a
health care planning scheme mandated and funded under the National
45. 792 F.2d. 210 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 880 (1987).
46. Id. at 226.
47. 441 U.S. 1 (1979) reh'g denied, 450 U.S. 1050 (1981).
48. 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
49. 472 U.S. 284 (1985).
50. 452 U.S. 378 (1981).
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Health Planning and Resources Development Act of 1974."' The statute pro-
vided for "health systems agencies" ("HSA"), i.e., private, nonprofit advi-
sory groups receiving federal funding. Each HSA was mandated to develop
and promote health care planning in its local area and to implement the plan
"to the extent practicable ... with the assistance of individuals and public
and private entities in its health service area."52 The HSA with responsibil-
ity for Kansas City determined that the area was not in need of additional
hospital beds and that it would therefore not approve any additional acute
care beds. The plaintiff, who was planning the construction of a hospital,
did not seek the approval of the HSA. Plaintiff's application to Blue Cross
to become a participating member provider was rejected on the ground that
plaintiff failed to obtain the approval of the HSA.
The Supreme Court held that Blue Cross' decision was not immune from
antitrust liability because: (1) it was a private response to the advisory opin-
ion of a private body, neither compelled nor approved by a government
agency; (2) the application of the antitrust laws to the particular action
would not conflict with any particular statutory provision or regulatory or-
der; (3) the statute did not clearly contemplate enforcement by private prov-
iders of insurance; and (4) the statute was not in such conflict with the
antitrust laws as to create a "blanket exemption" for all activity undertaken
in response to planning recommendations.5 3
National Gerimedical did not hold that the plan violated the Sherman Act,
only that its activities did not fall within an exemption of it. Health plan-
ning is considered by many plans to constitute cost containment as well as a
public service and they continue to play a part in the Act. This caused the
Arkansas plan to be named a defendant in General Hospitals of Humana,
Inc. v. Baptist Medical System, Inc. 54
Among the defendants in Humana were the Blue Cross plan, Baptist
Medical System, Inc., which operated two hospitals in the Little Rock met-
ropolitan area, St. Vincent Infirmary, a large tertiary care hospital in Little
Rock, and an official of Baptist and an official of St. Vincent who were also
trustees on the plan board. The primary allegation was that the defendants
had conspired to exclude Humana from the Little Rock area by preventing it
from obtaining the necessary certificate of need ("CON").
Discovery produced no evidence that the plan had done anything other
51. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300e-4, 300K (1976).
52. Id. at § 3001-2(c)(1).
53. ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, ANTITRUST LAW DEVS. 602 (2d ed. 1984).
54. 1986-1 Trade Cas. (CCH), 66,996 (E.D. Ark. 1986). Only one of the four orders
and opinions issued by the court were published. The order and opinion granting the plan's
motion for summary judgment were not published.
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than oppose the CON before the Central Arkansas Health Systems Agency
("CAHSA") and the Statewide Health Coordinating Council ("SHCC").
The plan filed an affidavit stating that the decision to oppose Humana's ap-
plication was made at the staff level and was not presented to the board.
Humana was able to discover no evidence to controvert the affidavit but
argued that it had a right to additional discovery to attempt to find it. The
court disagreed, saying "[a] party should have a factual basis for its suit at
the time it brings the suit .... [D]iscovery is to be used only to support a
case, not to create a case.""
A year after granting summary judgment to the plan the court granted
summary judgment to Baptist.56 In that opinion the court made several in-
teresting rulings, including:
1) The actions of the defendant hospitals in obtaining CONs allegedly to
use up all new bed slots in the area were protected by the state action doc-
trine enunciated in Parker v. Brown. 57
2) The Fourth Circuit was incorrect in North Carolina v. P.LA. Ashe-
ville," in requiring "wholesale regulation of an entire industry" in order to
trigger the "active state regulation" requirement of the state action
doctrine. 9
3) Health systems agencies are government agencies within the meaning
of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine.' In arriving at this conclusion the court
relied on its earlier decision in Garst v. Stoco, Inc.61
National Gerimedical and Humana stand for the propositions that (1) ac-
tive engagement in planning will probably be held lawful, and (2) it is not
possible to prevent the institutional providers who are being opposed from
filing suit.62
55. Geveral Hospitals of Humana, Inc., No. LR-C-84-455, slip op. at 4 (E.D. Ark. Mar.
21, 1985) (order granting summary judgment motion of Blue Cross).
56. 1986-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 66,996 (E.D. Ark. 1986).
57. Genm Hospitals of Humana, 1986-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) at 1 62,115 (state action doc-
trine found in Parker v. Brownm 317 U.S. 341 (1943)).
58. 740 F.2d 274 (4th Cir. 1984) (en banc), cert. denied 471 U.S. 1003 (1985).
59. Gen. Hospitals of Humana, 1986-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) at 62,117.
60. The doctrine can be summarized as holding that a party's efforts to procure govern-
ment actions, even when motivated by anticompetitive intent, are protected from antitrust
scrutiny by the Constitutional right to petition the government. It was enunciated in Eastern
Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961) and United
Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
61. 604 F. Supp. 326 (E.D. Ark. 1985). See Gen. Hospitals of Humana, 1986-1 Trade Cas.
(CCH) at 62,118.
62. In this connection, the court seriously considered, but denied, the Arkansas plan's
petition for attorneys' fees in Gen. Hospitals of Humana.
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V. PREFERRED PROVIDER ORGANIZATIONS ("PPOs") 63
PPOs have been with us a relatively short period of time. They have,
nonetheless, had two antitrust cases before courts of appeal and have in-
duced an unusually large number of advisory opinions from the Antitrust
Division of the Department of Justice and from the Federal Trade Commis-
sion. Because they involve issues of pricing and of exclusion of providers,
PPOs are naturals for antitrust activity.
Unlike Health Maintenance Organizations ("HMOs"), PPOs can be im-
posed on the present network of hospitals and doctors without having to
build clinics or convert doctors into employees. Instead, PPOs operate on
the basis of an agreement between health care providers (hospitals, physi-
cians, pharmacies, etc.) and third party payers (insurance companies and
self-insured employers), whereby the providers agree to utilization review
and in some cases to discounted fees. In exchange, the payers offer a higher
reimbursement rate for the fees of such participating providers than for
those of nonparticipants. Higher reimbursement encourages the payor's
subscribers to patronize participating providers, thus increasing their patient
volume and permitting further discounts.
PPOs fall into two basic categories: provider controlled and nonprovider
controlled. Health care providers themselves establish and administer the
former organizations. Nonprovider PPOs are developed and run under the
auspices of an insurer, self-insured employer or intermediary corporation.
The arrangements between providers and payers are subject to numerous
variations. Some PPOs require provider or payor exclusivity (i.e., providers
can care only for PPO patients or PPO patients can only consult participat-
ing providers). Certain PPOs individually negotiate prices with each pro-
vider. Others offer either a basic fee for specific services or a flat discounted
rate. Exclusivity and price discounts are only two of the characteristics
which may differ from one. PPO to the next.
In a number of business review letters written to sponsors of proposed or
existing PPOs, the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") and the Depart-
ment of Justice ("DOJ"), Antitrust Division, have acknowledged that PPOs
confer many benefits on consumers of health care. 6 Nonetheless, the FTC
63. The PPO portion of this paper is based on a memorandum to the author from
Stephanie Thier, a 1987 summer associate at Pierson, Ball & Dowd and a student at Columbia
Law School.
64. PPOs and similar arrangements should help to revolutionize the dynamics of the
health care marketplace. First, they place price and utilization controls squarely on
the bargaining table, where they belong, subjecting them to "normal" market place/
incentives. Second, health insurers will begin to compete on premium levels, service,
and other competitive variables, giving consumers the opportunity to shop for the
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and DOJ, as well as the courts, emphasize that many antitrust issues are
raised by these organizations.
A. PPO Antitrust Issues
Sherman Antitrust Act violations for which PPOs may be liable include
monopolization, price-fixing, and boycotting or concerted refusal to deal.
Whether a PPO violates federal antitrust law, specifically depends on:
1) whether a PPO (a) creates a monopoly, or (b) constitutes an attempt
to monopolize, or (c) a conspiracy to monopolize in violation of Section 2 of
the Sherman Act;
2) whether a PPO, in developing a reimbursement plan for provider fees
and services, engages in illegal price fixing in violation of Section 1 of the
Sherman Act; and
3) whether a PPO, by limiting its membership, engages in an illegal boy-
cott or concerted refusal to deal in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act
which proscribes conspiracies in restraint of trade.
1. Monopoly; Attempt to Monopolize; Conspiracy to Monopolize
a. Monopoly
Possession of monopoly power, by itself, is not a violation of Section 2 of the
Sherman Act, which provides in part:
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize or
combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopo-
lize any part of the trade or commerce among the several states...
shall be deemed guilty of a felony.6
More than acquisition and retention of a dominant market share must exist
for a finding of illegal monopoly. It must further be demonstrated that mar-
ket power was not obtained or maintained lawfully through the marketing of
a superior product or service, but rather unlawfully, through restraints on
trade such as those proscribed by Section 1 of the Act.
Market or monopoly power is defined as "the power to control prices in
mix of price, service, quality, and convenience they prefer. Third, hospitals and phy-
sicians will be motivated to contain costs by controlling utilization and by pricing
competitively. And finally, an often-overlooked but very important benefit of PPOs
is the spur they give to nonparticipating physicians and hospitals to contain costs and
lower prices.
Remarks of J. Paul McGrath, Ass't. Att'y Gen., Antitrust Div., Dep't. of Justice, before the
33rd Annual ABA Spring Meeting 2-3 (discussing PPOs and the Antitrust Laws) (Mar. 22,
1985).
65. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976).
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the relevant market and exclude competition., 66 67 This element of control
is often inferred from a large market share but, as explained in Ball Memo-
rial Hospital Inc. v. Mutual Hospital Insurance, Inc. 68 "[m]arket share is
just a way of estimating market power, which is the ultimate consideration.
When there are better ways to estimate market power, the court should use
them." These other factors are based on the nature of the relevant market
and involve inquiries into the barriers to market entry, the geographic scope
of the relevant market and submarkets, and the elasticity of demand.69
In Ball, the court held that a Blue Cross/Blue Shield PPO in Indiana did
not have market power, despite possession of a large market share, because
the relevant market of health care financing remained competitive. The court
found few barriers to entry. It deemed that only start-up capital and a li-
cense are needed to enter the field and found that customers readily switched
allegiance to the plan offering the lowest cost. The court also indicated that
other companies wishing to develop PPOs could "divert production into the
market from outside," as no capital asset such as a building or facility is
necessary to enter the insurance or PPO business.7 ° The court concluded
that market share was not synonymous with market power in this instance.7"
Despite the desirability of weighing other factors, market share remains
an important criterion in deciding whether market power exists. The courts
have not been clear as to what share of the market will render a company or
organization suspect. However, the cases suggest that control of fifty percent
or greater is sufficient to raise doubts.
7 2
Most of the plans analyzed in FTC and DOJ business letters controlled
less than fifty percent of the market and therefore were not suspect on
grounds of monopoly. The letters suggest, however, that antitrust chal-
lenges might be made to proposed or existing PPOs which subsequently ac-
quire an excessive market share.
One plan that did encounter antitrust attack from the DOJ was the Stanis-
laus PPO ("SPPO"). 73 SPPO, which dissolved after the DOJ threatened to
file suit, was a plan controlled by 230 physicians practicing in and around
66. Reazin v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Kansas, Inc., 635 F. Supp. 1287, 1328 (D.
Kan. 1986).
67. There are those who would say market power is the power to control prices in the
relevant market or exclude competition.
68. 784 F.2d 1325, 1336 (7th Cir. 1986).
69. Id. at 1332.
70. Id. at 1335.
71. Id.
72. T. VAKERICS, ANTITusT BAsics 5.02 (1987). See also Reazin v. Blue Cross and
Blue Shield of Kansas, Inc., 635 F. Supp. 1287 (D. Kan. 1986).
73. U.S. Dep't of Justice Press Release (Oct. 12, 1983).
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Stanislaus County, California. The DOJ concluded that SPPO had been or-
ganized to discourage the establishment of competing PPOs and to eliminate
price competition among doctors. Although SPPO had a membership of
fifty percent of the physicians in one market area and ninety percent in an-
other, the DOJ focused not solely on the scope of membership but on the
fact that broad enrollment was compounded by the plan's provider exclusiv-
ity requirement. Participating physicians were prohibited from contracting
with any other PPOs, HMOs or alternative delivery systems not associated
with SPPO. The obvious result of this exclusivity would be to deprive poten-
tially competing PPOs access to a large number of physicians in the market
occupied by SPPO. That the exclusivity provision was the deciding factor
inducing the DOJ's antitrust challenge is evident when SPPO is compared
with cases upholding similarly broad but nonexclusive plans. In Kartell,7 4
for example, the court upheld the legality of a Blue Shield plan which con-
tracted with ninety-nine percent of area physicians. The Kartell plan did not
restrict the outside affiliations of participating providers. Thus, no produc-
tive asset was denied to competing PPOs. In the same vein, Ball warned
that "[w]hen a firm (or group of firms) controls a significant percentage of
the productive assets in the market, the remaining firms may not have the
capacity to increase their sales quickly to make up for any reduction by the
dominant firm or group of firms."75
Another example in which a large market share was determined not to
constitute a monopoly is found in a DOJ Letter to Franklin A. Sanchez.7 6
The DOJ explained that it had no intention of challenging a pharmaceutical
network, "Service for You" ("SFY"), even though SFY planned to permit
enrollment of pharmacies with up to a fifty percent market share in remote
rural areas. The DOJ emphasized that sizable enrollment in underdeveloped
areas was essential to a workable plan and it further stressed that, in all
market areas, SFY did not prohibit member pharmacies from contracting
with other organizations.77
In yet another letter,7" the FTC approved a PPO in which twelve percent
of the population was enrolled and sixty percent of area doctors participated
nonexclusively. The Commission nevertheless cautioned against the dangers
of exclusive contracts in this instance where provider membership was high.
74. 749 F.2d 922 (1st Cir. 1984).
75. 784 F.2d at 1335.
76. Letter from Charles F. Rule, Acting Asst. Att'y Gen., Antitrust Div., Dep't. of Justice
to Frank Snchez, Coordinator Pro Forma Committee to Create a Joint Venture (Oct. 3, 1986).
77. Id. at 3-4.
78. Letter from Bureau of Competition, Federal Trade Commision, to Gilbert M. Frimet,
Esq. (Mar. 6, 1984).
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An FTC letter to David A. Gates7 9 similarly denounced long-term, exclu-
sive contracts where many doctors or other providers were included in the
PPO. That letter, however, did not summarily prohibit all exclusive con-
tracts but instead indicated that exclusive contracts would be valid if on a
short-term basis and/or with fewer providers. Apparently, the FTC wishes
not to discourage the potentially positive, procompetitive effects of provider
exclusivity - loyalty, closer cooperation and dedication to offering superior,
lower cost services to PPO beneficiaries.
The DOJ Letter to Donald W. Fish ° stated that a PPO which enlists the
services of a majority of area physicians, even on a nonexclusive basis, may
lead to an illegal monopoly if the size of the dominant PPO creates an incen-
tive for providers to join only that particular organization.
If a PPO is deemed to possess market power, the next matter to be ex-
plored is whether such power has been acquired or maintained through ille-
gal conduct such as the restraints of trade discussed below. Reliance on
anticompetitive practices to dominate the market may lead to a finding of
monopolization in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act.
b. Attempt to Monopolize
An attempt to monopolize exists when the accused firm or firms (1) have a
specific intent to monopolize, (2) engage in anticompetitive conduct mani-
festing that intent, and (3) have a dangerous probability of success for domi-
nating the market."1 While the FTC and DOJ letters do not address this
potential form of antitrust violation, some of the case law has considered
attempt claims. A showing of attempt to monopolize closely tracks the re-
quirements for a finding of illegal monopoly; however, a finding of specific
intent on the part of the actors is required whereas proof of a monopoly
demands only a finding of general intent.
A "dangerous probability" of successful domination of the relevant mar-
ket may be shown, in part, by a substantial market share. According to
Vakerics, a forty percent or larger market share will usually be necessary to
find a "dangerous probability." 2 As mentioned above, however, market
power analysis is most accurate when based on consideration of additional
factors such as market trends, strength of competitors and barriers to entry.
79. Letter from Jeffrey I. Zuckerman, Director, Bureau of Competition, Federal Trade
Commission, to David A. Gates, Commissioner of Insurance (Nov. 5, 1986).
80. Letter from William F. Baxter, Asst. Att'y. Gen., Antitrust Div., Dep't. of Justice, to
Donald W. Fish, Senior Vice Pres. and General Counsel, Hospital Corp. of America (Sept. 21,
1983).
81. T. VAKERICS, supra note 72.
82. Id.
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c. Conspiracy to Monopolize
A conspiracy to monopolize is shown through (1) an agreement to mo-
nopolize, (2) actions in furtherance of the agreement (i.e., not purely incho-
ate action), and 3) an intent to monopolize.8 3 Market power or substantial
market share need not be demonstrated for a finding of conspiracy, as the
violation centers around the illegal agreement or understanding between par-
ties with the aim to eliminate competition from the market.
In relation to all claims of monopoly under Section 2 of the Sherman Act,
it bears reiteration that market power alone is insufficient ground for finding
a violation.84 It is not enough that a company intends to harm rivals or to
do all the business that it can. To penalize this intent is to penalize competi-
tion.85 The monopolist must intend to eliminate competition on grounds
unrelated to efficiency. Some courts have phrased the monopoly inquiry as
"whether the large firm intended to 'transfer' power from one market to
another or to do something smaller firms could not do.",8 6 Another pro-
posed inquiry is whether the large company can, and plans to, raise its rivals'
business costs. 87 These inquiries are subject, however, to qualifications. For
example, an incidental, yet legitimate, effect of a well run PPO is the attrac-
tion of customers away from higher priced competitors. Consequently, the
dominant PPO may offer lower rates while the less efficient and smaller com-
peting PPO will be required to raise the fees charged to its dwindling pool of
patients. A monopoly will be found in the presence of market power only
when rivals' costs of doing business are increased because of the dominant
company's predatory practices.
PPOs with nonexclusive provider agreements, even when they enroll fifty
percent or more of providers in the relevant market, do not abolish opportu-
nities for competition but, rather, may actually foster such opportunities.
When exclusive contracts are used, the enrollment of a large percentage of
providers may be monopolistic because competitors are denied access to a
necessary productive asset. PPOs which employ nonexclusive contracts are
probably free from Section 2 liability even when enlisting a large number of
providers because these PPOs do not usually deter market entry by compet-
ing health plans.88
83. Instructional Systems Dev. Corp. v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 787 F.2d 1395,
1402 (10th Cir. 1986).
84. Kartell, 749 F.2d at 927.
85. Ball, 784 F.2d at 1339.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Cf Letter from William F. Baxter, Asst. Att'y. Gen., Antitrust Div., Dep't. of Jus-
tice, to Donald W. Fish (Sept. 21, 1983) (discussing nonexclusive contracts and the need for
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2. Price Fixing
Price fixing among competitors (i.e., horizontal) has long been held to be a
per se violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. Nonetheless, recent
cases,8 9 as well as FTC and DOJ business review letters to PPOs, have
carved out exceptions to the per se rule against price-fixing agreements.
These cases hold that a rule of reason analysis should be employed in explor-
ing price-fixing agreements when the price-fixing is "incidental to some
otherwise valid business goal," 90 rather than a scheme "whose predominant
purpose is the suppression of price competition." 91
In Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS ("BMI")92 the Supreme Court refused to
apply a per se analysis to a price-fixing arrangement when it determined that
"agreement on price [was] necessary to market the product [an ASCAP
blanket license] at all." 93 The Court emphasized that the "literal approach
does not alone establish that [a] . .. practice is . . . 'plainly anticompeti-
tive.' "9' The Court concluded that, although a per se rule might still be
appropriate in cases of "naked price-fixing," a rule of reason is necessary
where, as in BMI, "the challenged practice may have redeeming competitive
virtues and . . . the search for those values is not almost sure to be in
vain."
A rule of reason analysis96 involves an exploration and balancing of the
procompetitive and anticompetitive effects of the challenged practice. Some
of the factors to explore when applying the rule of reason to PPO activities
have been outlined by the FTC. These include:
Proportions of the hospital and physician services markets in-
volved in the contract, the purposes of the contract, its duration,
the extent to which it deters entry, the benefits the hospital and the
public derive from it, and the extent of competition for the
further consideration by the DOJ if a larger percentage of providers in any relevant geographic
market become affiliated only with the proposed PPO).
89. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n. v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984); Broad-
cast Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1 (1979); Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines,
Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 226 (D.C. Cir. 1986) ("the extent that Topco and Sealy [1972 and 1967
Supreme Court decisions] stand for the proposition that all horizontal restraints are illegal per
se, they must be regarded as effectively overruled.").
90. 1984-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) P 7,307 (Nov. 17, 1983) (opinion of the Attorney General
of Ohio).
91. Id.
92. 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
93. Id. at 23.
94. Id. at 9.
95. Id. at 13.
96. For the classic articulation of the "rule of reason, see Chicago Board of Trade v.
United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
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contract.
97
The PPO Task Force, at the April 2, 1987 Spring Meeting of the Ameri-
can Bar Association ("ABA") Antitrust Section, suggested that the strict
rule of Maricopa98 may no longer apply. 99 Nonetheless, a study of the FTC
and DOJ business review letters does lead to the conclusion that although
legitimate price-fixing between competing practitioners does not require that
joint venturers pool capital and share risk, it does require that establishment
of prices be ancillary to an otherwise procompetitive joint enterprise which
creates a new product or permits new efficiencies.'O°
Nonprovider PPOs are less likely to be attacked for price-fixing, but they
may be subject to challenge upon allegations that providers in fact control
the PPO's decision-making process on reimbursement determinations. In
Barry v. Blue Cross of California,t"' for example, the plaintiffs, two doctors,
alleged that a Blue Cross PPO was actually controlled by the Physicians
Relations Committee ("PRC") which the plan had established to serve as an
advisory panel. In the alternative, the plaintiffs claimed that the PPO was
created through conscious parallelism between participating physicians. The
court found no evidence that the PRC review influenced or had authority
over the PPO and, in fact, evidence existed to the contrary. 102 The court
also found no tacit agreement or parallelism between physicians as no eco-
nomic interdependence existed among them and participation in the PPO
was not contrary to the physicians' self-interests. Rather, each physician
had an independent economic reason for joining the PPO.'°3
Several other cases explore the problem of tacit provider control of PPOs
which may subject such organizations to liability for price-fixing and other
horizontal restraints. In Pennsylvania Dental Association v. Medical Service
Association of Pennsylvania,10 4 the court stated that "[t]o the extent that
Blue Shield's establishment of the UCR [usual, customary, reasonable] reim-
bursement system might disguise or embody an agreement among competing
providers, its actions would come within the purview of Section 1 of the
Sherman Antitrust Act."' 0 5 Hence, overt agreement between providers is
not essential to a finding of horizontal price-fixing. The court stated that
97. FTC Complaints and Orders (CCH) $ 22,005 (Feb. 24, 1983).
98. 457 U.S. 332 (1982).
99. PPO Task Force Presentation at Spring Meeting, I ABA ANTITRUST HEALTH CARE
CHRONICLE 5, 6 (1987).
100. J.P. McGrath, supra note 64; 468 U.S. at 113.
101. 805 F.2d 866 (9th Cir. 1986).
102. Id. at 869.
103. Id. at 869-70.
104. 745 F.2d 248 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1016 (1985).
105. Id. at 257.
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majority provider membership on review and policy committees "without
more, does not make out a prima facie case of structural horizontal conspir-
acy." 0 6 Rather, the nature and power of these committees must be ex-
plored on a case-by-case basis to determine whether they are authoritative
or merely advisory to a nonprovider dominated decision-making body.
A number of nonprovider plans examined in the FTC and DOJ business
review letters also contained physician or provider dominated Utilization
Review Committees which advised specifically on nonprice matters. In
some programs, prices were individually negotiated with, or offered to, each
provider.'o 7 In another instance the intermediary, Health Care Management
Associates ("HCMA"), offered contracting providers two payment options:
(1) the lesser of the provider's charges or a maximum fee schedule deter-
mined by HCMA, or (2) a payor established flat discount rate on the usual,
customary and reasonable fee of the provider.'0 8 In some cases, an interme-
diary solicits prices or discount rates from third party payers and submits
them to individual providers for acceptance or rejection."
If providers do unduly influence the price schedules of ostensibly nonpro-
vider controlled PPOs, the court may explore whether such agreements are
"naked" price restraints per Maricopa," ° or are necessary ancillary meas-
ures in furtherance of a procompetitive business venture. No FTC, DOJ or
judicial statement has been issued as to what type of analysis would apply to
payor-PPOs which mask provider price agreements. However, it is possible
that, although no risk-sharing is involved when a payor or other corporation
controls the PPO, physician price agreements will be considered necessary to
offer the product at all or to promote efficiency. Nonetheless, one view is
that "where the providers play no part in the establishment of the PPO...
fee setting by the providers may be viewed as per se illegal .... In this
situation the price setting is not necessary for the establishment and opera-
tion of the PPO; the prices can just as well be set by the nonproviders who
sponsor the PPO." " '
Although a unilaterally established price is immune from antitrust attack,
106. Id. at 258.
107. Letter from Arthur N. Lerner, Asst. Director, Bureau of Competition, Federal Trade
Commission, to Michael L. Denger, Esq. (Sept. 21, 1983); Letter from Antitrust Div., DOJ to
Donald W. Fish, supra note 80.
108. Letter from Emily H. Rock, Secretary, Federal Trade Commission, to Irwin S. Smith,
M.D. (June 7, 1983).
109. Letter from Robert P. Taylor, Esq., to J.P. McGrath, Asst. Att'y. Gen., Antitrust
Div., Dep't. of Justice (Dec.12, 1984).
110. Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982).
111. 1984-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 7,307 (opinion of the Attorney General of Ohio) (cita-
tions omitted).
1988)
254 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. 4:227
payor controlled PPOs could incur price-fixing liability as buyers if several
insurers combine to form the PPO. Kartell explained that "[a]ntitrust law
rarely stops the buyer of a service from trying to determine the price ... of
the product .... Thus, the more closely Blue Shield's activities resemble, in
essence, those of a purchaser, the less likely they are unlawful. '"" 2 Although
the court acknowledged that horizontal price-fixing between purchasers has
been held per se illegal, it explained that cases which found such conspiracies
between buyers generally involved "sham" organizations whose only pur-
pose was to join independent buyers so as to suppress the "competitive in-
stinct to bid up price."'1 13
3. Boycott or Concerted Refusal to Deal
A classic group boycott or concerted refusal to deal involves agreement by
a group of competing persons or firms to exclude other competitors so as to
gain advantage by forcing them out of business or forcing acceptance of cer-
tain terms.'14 While typical horizontal group boycotts have been accorded
per se treatment when "directly aimed at excluding or limiting competitors
... not all concerted refusals to deal can be classified so simply.'" 15 The
FTC emphasizes that concerted exclusion of certain providers does not usu-
ally constitute a boycott when exclusion is incidental to the establishment of
an effective PPO and the PPO does not possess market power.
Exclusion by provider controlled PPOs involves horizontal agreement
among competing providers. These PPOs are therefore subject to antitrust
attack when exclusionary practices are interpreted as a boycott. When pro-
vider PPOs constitute a joint venture, as described in the discussion of price-
fixing, the PPOs may avoid liability for boycotting provided the DOJ or
FTC standards for judging legitimate horizontal restraints are met. A com-
bination of these two sets of standards provides a helpful analysis for either
exposing or immunizing a joint venture with respect to an attack for boy-
cotting. The relevant inquiries would be:
1) whether the horizontal restraint, boycott, or concerted refusal
to deal, is incidental and necessary to a procompetitive business
venture;
2) whether the joint venture's market share is so large as to be
anticompetitive;
112. Kartell, 749 F.2d at 925.
113. Id.
114. T. VAKERICS, supra note 71, at 6.03 (1987).
115. 1984-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 7,307 (Nov. 17, 1983)(opinion of the Attorney General
of Ohio).
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3) whether there is an anticompetitive purpose behind the ven-
ture; and
4) whether the venture's procompetitive effects outweigh its an-
ticompetitive consequences.
Even when a joint venture is not found, St. Bernard General Hospital v.
Hospital Service Association'16 states that three factors must exist for a re-
fusal to deal to fall within a per se analysis. These are:
1) an anticompetitive motive for the concerted action, Le., the
agreement not to deal;
2) a commercial purpose underlying the agreement, "rather than
... an attempt at industry self regulation;" and
3) coercive economic pressure.'17
St. Bernard also stated that an affirmative defense exists when "the restric-
tions were reasonable, or were the least restrictive methods to achieve a legit-
imate business goal."" ' 8
It is apparent that the FTC has emphasized that a concerted refusal to
deal, horizontal or vertical, will be illegal when there is market power, re-
gardless of whether the PPO is a joint venture or whether the exclusion is
the least restrictive means to achieve the desired ends. The requirement that
there be no market power when refusing to deal is incorporated into the test
for a legitimate restraint in cases of joint ventures. When joint venture anal-
ysis is used, market share, if indicative of market power, may render a hori-
zontal restraint illegal. The requirement is also implicit in the St. Bernard
defense which demands use of the least restrictive measure toward achieve-
ment of a legitimate business goal. It is presumed that "legitimate" sub-
sumes the meaning "procompetitive." A monopoly which excludes
competitors is not procompetitive.
The FTC and DOJ advisory letters emphasize that, in PPOs, inclusion is
more dangerous than exclusion." 9 A PPO which excludes all but a small
share of providers in the relevant market is less subject to antitrust challenge
than more inclusive plans which potentially create a monopoly. This is par-
ticularly true when a very inclusive plan is coupled with long-term, exclusive
provider contracts. In such cases, an anticompetitive intent is unnecessary
to find a boycott, although exclusion coupled with market power may serve
as evidence of such intent. Under the Colgate doctrine,120 absent an intent to
116. 712 F.2d 978 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 970 (1984).
117. Id. at 988.
118. Id.
119. J.P. McGrath, supra note 64; Letter to Gilbert M. Frimet, Esq., supra note 78.
120. United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919).
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monopolize, a unilateral refusal to deal does not violate antitrust law.' 21 In
Barry v. Blue Cross of California,1 22 the court concluded that a Blue Cross
plan which provided superior reimbursement for services of participating
providers to reimbursement for services of nonparticipants did not constitute
an unlawful boycott. "The [plaintiffs] argued that the plan involved had the
consequence of boycotting . . . nonparticipating physicians by interfering
with their access to patients insured by the Plan."1 23 The court agreed.
However, it also stated that "every contract between a buyer and seller has
precisely ... [this] effect."' 24 The plaintiffs further claimed that the PPO's
"referral clause" which encouraged patients to visit participating physicians
because of favorable reimbursement, was a concerted refusal to deal between
Blue Cross and participating providers because it discouraged patients from
visiting nonparticipants.1 25 The court held that such a clause merely in-
jected information into the market permitting the play of ordinary market
forces.' 26 It also found that Blue Cross possessed no monopoly power and
that no less restrictive means existed by which it could engage in its procom-
petitive activity.' 27 The court noted that the plaintiffs' proposed alternative
to have Blue Cross reimburse participants and nonparticipants at the same
rate was not an option. Such an alternative would eliminate any incentive
for providers to join the plan and offer discounts.1 28 Finally, since Blue
Cross' refusal to deal was unilateral, even if it had monopoly power its ac-
tions would be legitimate if it harbored no anticompetitive motive.
129
VI. COLGATE TO REAZIN, THE RIGHT NOT TO DEAL(?)
In 1919, the Supreme Court stated:
[i]n the absence of any purpose to create or maintain a monopoly,
the [Sherman] Act does not restrict the long recognized right of
trader or manufacturer engaged in an entirely private business,
freely to exercise his own independent discretion as to parties with
whom he will deal. 130
In 1960, the Supreme Court constructed a retainer around Colgate when it
121. Id. at 307.
122. 805 F.2d 866 (9th Cir. 1986).
123. Id. at 871.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 872.
126. Id. at 872-73.
127. Id. at 873.
128. Id.
129. See T. VAKERICS, supra note 72, at 7.13 (1987). See the attached Appendix for a list
of pro and anti-cometitive factors as set forth in FTC and DOJ Advisory Letters.
130. United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. at 307 (1919).
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decided United States v. Parke, Davis & Co. 3' Parke-Davis claimed it did
no more than maintain resale prices solely through unilateral refusals to do
business with noncomplying customers and that its actions fell within the
Colgate doctrine. The Court rejected this argument. It found that Parke-
Davis induced wholesalers to stop selling to offending retailers; that it se-
cured adherence to its prices from a number of retailers, assuring each that
its competitors would maintain prices if the retailer would do likewise;' 32
that it solicited retailers' assistance in reporting discounts by other druggists;
and that Parke-Davis permitted offending retailers to purchase its products
again after they had indicated a willingness to stop discounting. 33 The
Court concluded that Parke-Davis had thus embarked upon a program to
secure compliance with its suggested resale prices that "plainly exceeded the
limitations of the Colgate doctrine," and stated:
[w]hen the manufacturer's actions, as here, go beyond mere an-
nouncement of his policy and the simple refusal to deal, and he
employs other means which effect adherence to his resale prices,
... he has put together a combination in violation of the Sherman
Act. 134
So, "mere announcement of the policy and simple refusal to deal" are the
safe parameters.
In Reazin v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Kansas 13and Reazin 11,136 the
mammoth opinion of the court denying the plan's motion for a judgment
N.O.V. and granting summary judgment against the plan's counterclaim is-
sued on May 22, 1987, the court ruled against the plan and upheld the fol-
lowing jury award:
$5,400,000.00 in damages
2,176,983.75 in plaintiffs' legal fees
246,844.99 in costs
$7,823,828.74 total'3 7
This enormous sum resulted from the plan refusing to deal with HCA's
Wesley Hospital. What happened to Colgate?
There are, of course, two ways to look at Reazin. It could be said that the
plan was merely entering into a PPO with St. Joseph's Hospital and St.
Francis Hospital and that it was under no obligation to include Wesley Hos-
pital. It could also be said, as the court did, that the plan entered into an
131. 362 U.S. 29 (1960).
132. Id. at 33-34.
133. Id at 35-36.
134. Id. at 44.
135. 635 F Supp. 1287 (D. Kan. 1986).
136. 663 F. Supp. 1360 (D. Kan. 1987).
137. Id. at 1493.
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agreement with St. Joseph's and St. Francis under the terms of which those
hospitals agreed to give the plan a discount on existing rates in return for the
plan terminating its contract with Wesley, thus increasing the patient popu-
lation of St. Joseph's and St. Francis.
When a plan discusses with a provider or providers the termination of a
contract with a competitor of that provider or those providers, the seeds of
litigation are sown. Perhaps that is the principle lesson of Reazin.
As noted earlier, chiropractors remain active plaintiffs. In fact, one of
their lawsuits reached a federal appellate court over 10 years ago and the
litigation is still continuing. 38
In Leone v. Pierce County Medical Bureau,'3 9 a "not for publication"
opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the
defendant health insurer offered chiropractic coverage only as an optional
rider for an additional premium."1  Also, chiropractic benefits were limited
to treatment that would have been covered "if it had been performed by a
participating physician."141
The plaintiffs alleged that the corporate defendant was, in effect, a struc-
tural conspiracy, i.e., M.D.s and osteopaths protecting themselves from
competition from chiropractors. This was, the chiropractors claimed, a per
se violation of section one of the Sherman Act.142 The Ninth Circuit
disagreed:
The Supreme Court recently indicated that "a plaintiff seeking ap-
plication of the per se rule" to an alleged boycott must show that it
"falls into a category likely to have predominantly anticompetitive
effects." That case involved a challenge to an expulsion from a
joint venture. The court held that application of the per se rule
was improper because the plaintiff had not shown that the defend-
ant joint venture "possesses market power or unique access to a
business element necessary for effective competition." In the pres-
ent case, the chiropractors also fail to show that the bureaus pos-
sess market power or control a necessary competitive element.
Application of the per se rule is, therefore, unwarranted.143
The Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiff chiropractors had not shown the
138. Ballard v. Blue Shield of South West Virginia, Inc., 543 F.2d 1075 (4th Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 350 U.S. 991 (1977). In Ballard the court of appeals reversed a district court
dismissal on interstate commerce grounds and remanded for trial. The case was subsequently
settled.
139. No. CA 84-4374, slip. op. (9th Cir. July 16, 1985).
140. Id. at 3.
141. Id. at 2.
142. Id. at 3.
143. Id. (citation omitted).
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necessary competitive injury.'" Because this is an unpublished opinion, it is
worth quoting from at length.
Purchasers of plan coverage are given a choice of whether to
purchase chiropractic benefits. All state contracts must include
chiropractic benefits and a number of private purchasers have also
opted for such coverage. Unless it is presumed that these purchas-
ers are acting irrationally, there must be some economic justifica-
tion for the price differential between basic coverage and coverage
with chiropractic benefits. Otherwise, no purchasers would opt for
coverage with chiropractic benefits. The plaintiffs, in fact, admit
that an increase in the number of health professionals under a
given plan will increase the cost of providing service. Without any
economic data on what costs the inclusion of chiropractors would
involve, it is impossible to say that the defendants' policy is a re-
straint of trade and not a recognition of economic realities. More-
over, because plan purchasers are given a choice of coverage, an
analysis of the relevant markets is necessary to determine whether
the plan arrangement reduces "the importance of consumer prefer-
ence." The plaintiffs recognize that a demonstration of the defend-
ants' market power is essential to their case yet they fail to present
any evidence on this issue. The defendants' plans cover only a
small percentage - 20 percent to 30 percent - of the health care
markets in Washington and that percentage has been declining.
They also face competition from closed-panel or HMO plans. Fi-
nally, a substantial portion of the defendants' plans do provide for
chiropractic benefits. Without significant market power, any at-
tempt by the defendants to foist unreasonable fees upon plan pur-
chasers desiring chiropractic benefits would simply drive those
purchasers to deal with other health care providers. The evidence
indicates, however, that several purchasers have chosen the chiro-
practic benefits with the additional premium. The plaintiffs have
failed to establish any competitive injury. The evidence they
presented on their projected business losses is irrelevant; competi-
tive injury to the market is the significant consideration. The
choice of benefits offered to plan purchasers distinguishes Virginia
Academy of Clinical Psychologists v. Blue Shield of Virginia, on
which the plaintiffs rely for support. In that case, there existed an
absolute prohibition on the inclusion of benefits for psychologist
treatment. Reimbursement was available for psychologist treat-
ment if it was billed through a plan physician, but plan purchasers
- who are the significant economic actors in the market for health
services - were offered no choice regarding the direct inclusion of
144. Id. at 5-6 (citations omitted).
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psychologist benefits for their subscribers. In Blue Shield of Vir-
ginia, no choice of benefits was offered and consumer preferences
and the natural market forces were, accordingly, stymied. In the
present case, plan purchasers are offered a choice and several have
exercised the option for chiropractic benefits. In the absence of a
market analysis, a trier of fact could not conclude that this situa-
tion does not represent a competitive market. 145
Johnson v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of New Mexico, '46 is pending before the
United States District Court for the District of New Mexico. It was sched-
uled to go to trial on August 31, 1987 but was continued indefinitely sua
sponte by the court. The plaintiffs are chiropractors. The defendants are
now the Blue Cross and Blue Shield plan and the New Mexico Medical Soci-
ety, the individual plan trustee defendants having been dismissed by the
plaintiffs. 147
The plaintiffs allege an agreement to boycott chiropractors (1) between the
plan and the medical society and (2) between the plan and the M.D.s on its
board, as in Virginia Academy. For good measure they also allege a hazy
sort of conspiracy between BCBSA, which is not a defendant, and the
plan.14 BCBSA, or its predecessors BSA and NABSP, required that plans
have either the endorsement of the area medical society or participating pro-
vider agreements with over fifty percent of the area M.D.s in order to use the
Blue Shield name and mark.' 4 9 This requirement was intended to, and did,
coerce the plan to agree with the medical society not to offer chiropractic
coverage in return for receiving the medical society's endorsement. 50 The
court entered two important pre-trial orders. The first denied class action
status to the plaintiffs. The second denied the plan's motion for summary
judgment. 5' In denying the plan's motion for summary judgment, the court
found no direct evidence of any agreement. Indeed, the most pertinent evi-
dence on that issue was a memorandum of a medical society committee
chairman written after the plan offered chiropractic coverage on an optional
basis, as in Leone.'52 The memorandum expressed anger over the plan's
action but admitted the medical society had no control over the plan, and
145. Id. at 4-6 (citations omitted).
146. No. CV 83-1637 HB (N.M. May 14, 1987).
147. The plan's D & 0 carrier, Harbor Ins. Co., refused to commit itself either to pay
attorneys' fees or a judgment if there were one, and indicated that because the complaint al-
leged that the trustees were acting on behalf of their own economic interests there might well
be no obligations of any kind on the carrier.
148. Johnson, No. CV83-1637 HB, at 3-4.
149. Id. at 4.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 1.
152. Id. at 8-9.
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therefore could do nothing about it.'53 Nevertheless, the court found that a
jury could infer a conspiracy from facts adduced through discovery and
from the deposition testimony of one of the plaintiffs' expert witnesses.' 54
The court began its analysis with the observation that an inference of a
conspiracy may be drawn when a defendant acts in contradiction to its eco-
nomic interests.'55 The court then pointed to a memorandum of a former
plan marketing vice-president that indicated a potential for 65,000 to 70,000
new subscribers if chiropractic coverage was offered as evidence from which
a jury could infer that the plan operated contrary to its own economic
interest. ' 5
6
The court rejected the plan's argument that it had an economic motive for
refusing to provide chiropractic coverage because it would have been forced
to raise premium rates if such coverage were provided. The court stated that
"this argument is belied by evidence in the record in which Blue Cross as-
sured physician members of the New Mexico Medical Society that premium
rates for contracts not receiving chiropractic coverage would not be in-
creased."' 5 7 This conclusion, however, ignored evidence as to the lack of
effect of adding chiropractic coverage on rates which would be only tempo-
rary - and indeed was temporary. It also ignored the fact that a unilateral
desire (1) not to lose participating physicians and (2) to have the ability to
offer service benefits with a large physician selection constituted an economic
motivation consistent with the plan's actions.
The court went on to say, "[p]laintiffs have also demonstrated that defend-
ants had a motive to enter into an agreement."' 58 The physician members of
the medical society knew that the plan required their participation or the
endorsement of the medical society if the plan was to retain its right to use
the Blue Shield name and mark. In 1981, only sixty percent of the physi-
cians in New Mexico were participating physicians. The plan would have
suffered financially if it could not use the name and mark. The plan was
concerned that if it provided chiropractic coverage, it would lose many par-
ticipating physicians or that the physicians would take some action against
Blue Cross.' 59
The court rejected the plan's argument that none of this permitted an in-
ference of an agreement. The facts were actually consistent with a unilateral





158. Id. at 8.
159. Id.
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decision not to offer chiropractic coverage because, among other reasons in-
cluding the necessity of raising rates, the plan did not want to lose its partici-
pating physicians and thus limit the number of physicians available to
subscribers who had been promised service benefits rather than
indemnity. "
The court went on to state that an inference of agreement could also be
drawn from the plan's "repeated attempts to reassure the physician members
of the New Mexico Medical Society that the limited coverage of chiropractic
benefits when demanded would preserve Blue Cross' right to exclude chiro-
practic benefits from all of its policies."'' The court rejected the plan's
argument that the logical inference to be drawn from the events following
the plan's offering of chiropractic was that the plan was trying to mollify
physicians so as not to lose their participation.' 62 As noted above, a Medi-
cal Society memorandum prepared at the time chiropractic was offered ac-
knowledged that the society had no right to control the plan's decision to
offer chiropractic coverage. The court stated, nonetheless, that:
These communications are sufficient to allow a jury to infer an
agreement between Blue Cross and the physician members of the
New Mexico Medical Society to deny chiropractic coverage. A
jury might find that Blue Cross was concerned that its decision to
provide such coverage would be construed as a breach of its agree-
ment, necessitating frequent communications between the organi-
zation and the physicians in order to reassure the physicians that
Blue Cross was still opposed to coverage of chiropractic services in
all of its contracts. 63
Again, this conclusion ignores the fact that not even the Medical Society
or the physicians who were unhappy about the decision to offer chiropractic
coverage, including one who resigned from the plan board, ever wrote or
said that there had been any kind of an agreement or understanding with
respect to chiropractic coverage. The plan's attempt to explain its decision
to physicians was the logical action of a corporation that wanted to maintain
good relations with physicians during a difficult time of transition. How-
ever, the court ignored that as a motive consistent with the plan's own eco-
nomic interests.
The court then turned to the issue of whether "the challenged conduct...
constituted an unreasonable restraint of trade". 4 It rejected the plaintiffs'
160. Id. at 8-9.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 10.
164. Id.
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argument that the plan's conduct fell within "the narrow category of restric-
tive practices to which per se analysis applies" '165 saying, "[while] the
Supreme Court has included group boycotts in the category of practices la-
belled unlawful per se, it recently explicitly retreated from that position in
Federal Trade Commission v. Indiana Federation of Dentists . 166 The
court added, "[a]lthough concerted action to raise prices may be per se ille-
gal, concerted action on nonprice restrictions is judged under the rule of
reason."1 6
7
The court, having agreed that the case should be analyzed under a rule of
reason, then rejected the plan's argument. 168 The plan argued that because
it did not possess market power, "an essential component of the inquiry
under the rule of reason," there could be no violation. 169 The court did
acknowledge that "market power is traditionally defined as the ability to
raise prices above those that would be charged in a competitive market.' '"7o
The plan's market share was by the plaintiffs'estimation thirty percent and
was probably lower. The usual giant commercial carriers were active in
New Mexico, as was one well established, powerful HMO and several
smaller HMOs. It seemed apparent that groups could, and would, switch
from Blue Cross/Blue Shield coverage to a commercial insurer or one of the
HMOs if the plan raised rates or cut back on benefits.
However, the court determined that the plan's market share might under-
state its market power. It pointed out that one of the plaintiffs' expert wit-
nesses, an economist from the University of New Mexico, testified that the
plan paid no premium taxes and no income tax, and, under UCR, got a
discount from physicians.171 The expert testified in his deposition that with
these cost benefits the plan should have been able to obtain a much larger
market share than it did, and that the only logical conclusion as to why it
165. Id. at 12.
166. Id. (citation omitted).
167. Id. at 14 (citing Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 761 (1984).
168. Id. at 13-14.
169. Id. at 15.
170. Id. (quoting National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n. v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 109
n.38 (1984)).
171. None of these conclusions were accurate. The plan did pay a premium tax, although
it was lower than that paid by commercial carriers because the plan took advantage of a New
Mexico statute which authorized a lower tax to any corporation which invested a certain
amount of its reserves in New Mexico corporations. Also, UCR does not really provide a
discount. In ninety percent of the cases, the plan pays the usual fee of the physician not a
discounted fee. There was nothing in the record to indicate that any other carrier paid more
connection with the ten percent of fees submitted which might be above the maximum custom-
ary allowance. Like all non-profit corporations, the plan paid no income tax, but that was
probably true of many commercial carriers and there was no evidence that any of them paid
corporate income tax.
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did not was that it was overpaying its executives and participating physi-
cians, who must have had control over the plan. 7 2 There was absolutely no
evidence in the record that the plan paid participating physicians more than
any other carrier or that it overpaid any of its executives. Indeed, there was
no evidence as to what its executives were paid or what the executives of
other insurance carriers were paid. The court set forth its conclusion in the
following terms:
[Dr. Sass] notes that because of the non-profit status of Blue Cross,
administrators and physicians controlling the Board of Directors
have incentive to limit Blue Cross' market share by keeping the
levels of reimbursements to physicians and administrative costs
high, thereby artificially depressing Blue Cross' market share. 17 3
With respect to ease of entry, the court again relied on Dr. Sass who "con-
cede[d] that the cost of entering the New Mexico health insurance market
are [sic] relatively low, but also points out that none of the 116 insurance
companies who have entered the market during the past ten years have been
able to capture even a one percent market share."' 74 From this the court
concluded:
These statistics suggest that Blue Cross' 25 to 30 percent share of
the market may, in fact, reflect market power. When that market
share is considered, as well as the market share of Blue Cross'
nearest competitor [who had approximately 121/2 percent market
share], and the inability of entering companies to capture any sig-
nificant portion of the market in health care insurance, it is appar-
ent that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Blue
Cross possesses market power in the health care insurance field.11 5
On these bases, the court denied the motion for summary judgment.
Counsel for the plan believe the opportunity may arise to request the court
to reconsider its motion for summary judgment and plan to seek such
reconsideration.
Before leaving chiropractors, we should consider the August 27, 1987
memorandum opinion and order of the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois in Wilk v. American Medical Association,17 6
This, of course, is the case brought by chiropractors against the American
Medical Association ("AMA"), the Joint Commission on Accreditation of
Hospitals ("JCAH") and a number of other professional societies such as the
172. Id. at 16.
173. Id. (footnote omitted).
174. Id.
175. Id. at 17.
176. No. 76 C 3777, slip op. (N.D. I11. Aug. 27, 1987) (order issuing injunction against
defendants AMA, ACS and ACR).
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American College of Physicians and the American College of Radiology. A
jury found for defendants in the first trial, but the Seventh Circuit reversed
in Wilk."' Shortly before the second trial, the plaintiffs dropped their de-
mand for damages and went forward solely with respect to the injunctive
relief.' This made the case equitable in nature and converted it from a jury
trial to a bench trial.
The lengthy slip opinion of Judge Susan Getzendanner is a mixed bag.
The plaintiffs obtained their injunction against the AMA, the American Col-
lege of Radiologists and the American College of Surgeons, but not against
JCAH, the American College of Physicians, the American Academy of
Orthopaedic Surgeons and James H. Sammons, M.D., an AMA official.
Judge Getzendanner began her opus magnus with an evidentiary ruling.
Plaintiffs had relied upon a document entitled "Chiropractic in New Zea-
land: Report of the Commission of Inquiry" ("the New Zealand Report") to
show that chiropractic was a valid health care profession.' 7 9 The court re-
fused to receive it for that purpose, agreeing with a report prepared by the
United States Congress' Office of Technology Assessment ("OTA") which
was critical of the report because it was not based upon "well designed, con-
trolled clinical trials."'8 ° The court admitted the report into evidence for
the limited extent "to show information available on chiropractic in the lat-
ter half of 1979."''8
The AMA's Ethical Principle 3 was the focal point of the opinion. Princi-
ple 3 reads:
A physician should practice a method of healing founded on a sci-
,entific basis; and he should not voluntarily professionally associate
with anyone who violates this principle.
8 2
The court concluded "that the AMA and its members engaged in a group
boycott or conspiracy against chiropractors from 1966 to 1980 when Princi-
ple 3 was finally eliminated."83
As is often the case there was a smoking gun. The AMA defended its
actions on grounds of good health practices. The court, however, quoted a
physician member of the Committee on Quackery as saying, "it would be
well to get across that the Doctor of Chiropractic is stealing [the young
177. 719 F.2d 207 (7th Cir. 1983).
178. Wilk, No. 76 C 3777, slip op. at 3.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 8.
182. Id. at 3.
183. Id. at 21.
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medical physicians'] money."' 184
To the defendants' argument that the plaintiffs must specifically prove an
impact on price and output, the court responded:
The cases do not support that proposition. As Professor Areeda
recently noted in his article, "The Rule of Reason - a Catechism
on Competition," 55 ANTITRUST LAW JOURNAL 571 (1986), the
Supreme Court has held that the purpose of the inquiry into mar-
ket definition and market power is to determine whether an ar-
rangement has the potential for genuine adverse effects on
competition. If there is actual proof of adverse effects, then the
plaintiffs need not prove market definition and market power. The
Supreme Court in Federal Trade Commission v. Indiana Federa-
tion of Dentists, stated that "the inquiry into market power is but a
surrogate for detrimental effects."' 8 5
The court found that the plaintiffs had established not only monetary in-
jury but also injury to their reputations. The fact that a physician member
of the Committee on Quackery had referred to chiropractors as "rabid dogs
and killers" was not helpful.'" 6 Basically, the court found that while
chiropractice may at one time have been an unscientific discipline, it has
changed but the AMA's position has not. With respect to the JCAH, the
court found that the JCAH opposed chiropractic but it did so unilaterally
and not in agreement with its own members or with the AMA.
The case is on appeal to the Seventh Circuit. Less serious lawsuits, which
are nonetheless time consuming and expensive, are brought by providers
that want to contract with plans. As noted earlier, it is impossible to stop
people from filing antitrust suits. One such action was Wheeler v. Blue Cross
and Blue Shield, '8 7 filed in the United States District Court for the District
of Nevada. The plaintiffs were the Degenerative Disease Medical Center
("DDMC") and a number of its past and present patients. DDMC was a
"hospital" that purported to cure cancer, arthritis and a number of other
diseases through the intravenous application ,of dimethyl sulphoxide
("DMSO").188 At least eight insurers to which DDMC submitted claims
denied coverage for the use of DMSO, laetrile and other therapy. The poli-
cies excluded payments because the treatments were either not medically
necessary or not generally accepted treatments.'8 9 One of the defendants
sought advice from the Clark County Medical Society as to the nature and
184. Id. at 22.
185. Id. at 25 (citation omitted).
186. Id. at 28.
187. No. CV-S-82-512-RDF slip op. (D. Nev. Oct. 30, 1982).
188. Id. at 2.
189. Id.
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validity of the treatment. The Wyoming plan sought general information
from the Nevada plan as to the nature of DDMC.'9 ° The treatments were
legal because the Food and Drug Administration had authorized the use of
DMSO for interstitial cystitis. It was the generally accepted medical opin-
ion, however, that DMSO would not cure or arrest cancer or cure or help
cure arthritis and the other illnesses treated at the facility. 19 1
The court granted the motions for summary judgment filed by all of the
defendants. It pointed out that:
[s]omething more than the mere exchange of information and par-
allel behavior must be shown to support an inference of conspiracy.
In addition, it must be shown that the parties acted against their
own individual business interests or that there was motivation to
enter into an agreement requiring parallel behavior.
9 2
The court went on to state that there was evidence of parallel acts by the
defendants and exchanges of information between the Clark County Medical
Society and Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Nevada and between Blue Cross
and Blue Shield of Nevada and Wyoming Blue Cross and Blue Shield. The
court pointed out, however, that:
Even consciously parallel behavior cannot, without more, support
a reasonable inference that defendants acted in concert. Nor does
evidence of exchanges of information, or mere opportunity to con-
spire allow a reasonable inference of conspiracy.
193
The court found that the Clark County Medical Society had shown that it
was in conformity with good business practice that it had interpreted the
experimental treatments given at the hospital, "admittedly the only center
offering this treatment in the United States" as not generally accepted medi-
cal practice.' 94 The Nevada and Wyoming plans also acted in a rational,
businesslike way from which no inference of conspiracy could be drawn.'9
The court, incidentally, erroneously found that Blue Cross of Nevada and
Blue Cross of Wyoming "had opportunities to conspire through their com-
munication and being under common directorship",' 96 but found that even
if this were true no inference of conspiracy could be drawn.' 97
The plaintiff hospital appealed the summary judgment entered against it
but subsequently dismissed the appeal when the owner of the hospital and
190. Id.
191. Id. at 3.
192. Id, at 5 (citations omitted).
193. Id. at 6 (citations omitted).
194. Id. at 7.
195. Id.
196. Id. (emphasis added).
197. Id.
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some members of its staff were convicted of committing a number of crimes
in connection with operation of the hospital.' 98
VII. CONCLUSION
Officers and directors of the plans cannot be insulated from policy deci-
sions of the type which boards of directors should make. Even if they were
so insulated, it would not protect the plan itself from being named a defend-
ant in an antitrust case as was shown in Reazin. Because members of the
board must make the important policy decisions for the plan, their protec-
tion from antitrust suits lies in making decisions which do not result in the
plan violating the antitrust laws.
The greater the provider influence on the plan board, the greater the dan-
ger of antitrust litigation because it leaves the way open for plaintiffs to al-
lege that the trustees were acting in their own economic interests in setting
prices, boycotting non-physicians, allocating territory or whatever. Because
physicians and institutional provider representatives can bring much needed
and valuable knowledge and expertise to a plan board, it does not make
sense to exclude them from board membership. The real danger is not in
their presence, but in their control or the perception of their control. Com-
mon sense balancing of provider input and provider influence both on the
board and on key committees dealing with price, the participation of types of
providers and other antitrust sensitive areas, along with knowledgeable anti-
trust advice can do much to reduce antitrust dangers.
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